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Williams’s  famous  argument  against  immortality  rests  on  the  idea  thatimmortality  cannot  be  desirable,  at  least  for  human  beings,  and  hiscontention has spawned a cottage industry of responses. As I will intend toshow, the arguments over his view rest on both a difference of temperament 1and a difference in the sense of desire being used. The former concerns adifference  in  the  perspective  one  takes  on  personal  identity;  the  latter  adistinction  between our  normal  desire  to  continue  living  and  the  kind  ofdesire implied in desiring immortality. Showing that there is some sense ofidentity and desire that support Williams’s conclusion goes some way towardproviding support for his argument, if not a full-fledged defense of it.
Williams  develops  his  argument  in  two  steps.  The  first  replies  to  theLucretian (and Epicurean) argument that death cannot be an evil for us. Inresponse,  he  argues  that  what  gives  us  reason to  live  are  our  categoricaldesires, and these in turn give us reason to think death undesirable. Unlike
1 See [Moore 2006].
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some  desires  that  are  conditional  on  our  being  alive  to  witness  theirsatisfaction,  many  of  our  desires  are  categorical:  we  want  to  finish  ourprojects,  see our friends and family thrive,  or witness the dawning of  theSingularity. Desires of this kind are not ones we hold merely to pass the timewhile we wait for death; they are desires that give us a reason to live in orderto see them through to their completion. But as long as we have such desires,this implies that we desire to see them fulfilled. Anything that would preventtheir fulfillment thus runs counter to our desires. Death, then, is an evil for usin  the  way that  anything that  frustrates  our  desires—all  of  our  desires—appears to us as a misfortune to be avoided.
But  in  the  second  step  of  the  argument,  Williams  rejects  the  seemingimplication of  the  first  step,  namely  that  since  we ostensibly always havereason to desire to postpone death, we thereby have a reason to desire topostpone  it  forever,  that  we  have  reason  to  find  immortality  desirable.Williams argues for this conclusion by means of setting up two conditionsthat immortality must meet in order to be desirable and then presenting adilemma for fulfillment of the second condition. The first condition is that “itshould clearly be  me who lives for ever. The second important condition isthat the state in which I survive should be one which, to me looking forward,will be adequately related, in the life it presents, to those aims which I now
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have in wanting to survive at all”.2  The first condition, in other words, is thatin order to be desirable, the eternal life in question must be  my eternal life,not the eternal life of another person. But Williams does little with this firstcondition, since he takes a broad view of personal identity, one which willallow  for  all  but  the  most  exotic  kinds  of  immortality.  It  is  the  secondcondition that drives his argument.
What  makes  continued  life  desirable  is  that  we  are  propelled  into  it  by  our
categorical desires. It is because I now have desires that can only be satisfied in
four to eighteen months—the desire to publish a paper, for example—that I have
reason to want to still  be alive in four to eighteen months. Williams takes his
second  condition  to  be  an  adaptation  of  this  model  to  the  desirability  of
immortality:  in  order  for  immortality to  be desirable,  my immortal  life  must  to
some extent satisfy my current categorical desires. Phrased this way, of course,
the condition looks suspicious: mortal humans seemingly have no desires that
require an infinite amount of time to satisfy. So we can better interpret Williams’s
condition as a requirement that, in order to be desirable, my immortal life must be
continually  propelled  forward  by  categorical  desires  or  projects  that  are
connected to those I now have in a foreseeable way. Were my future desires not
so related to my present ones, I could have no more reason to care about their
indefinite  continuation  and  possible  fulfillment  than  I  do  about  my neighbors’
desires. Even if my personal identity—on a conservative enough reading of that
2 [Williams 1973]
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fraught notion—could persist through a complete change in my aims and desires,
my desire for the satisfaction of those aims and desires could not.
Williams raises a dilemma for this second condition by noting that, given thathuman beings have characters of some sort that stand in a close conceptualrelation with their aims and desires, an immortal life must be either one witha  fixed  character  or  a  variable  one.3 Should  an  immortal  have  a  fixedcharacter her range of possible aims and projects would be circumscribedand, over a sufficiently long period of time, exhausted, such that the resultwould be an endless boredom. Much of the response to Williams has focusedon this claim.4 Though I think critics of this move tend to overlook just howmany of our experiences are easily reduced to patterns that over time appearto look like more of the same,5 here I will focus instead on the second horn ofthe dilemma: the life of an immortal with a changing character. In a sense, thesecond horn appears more realistic: our characters undergo changes, minorand sometimes major, throughout the course of our natural lives. Williams,focusing on the fictional case of Elena Makropulos, who became immortal at42, emphasizes that her boredom is “connected with the fact that everythingthat could happen and make sense to one particular human being of 42 had
3 For a discussion of the relation between character, desires, and projects, see Altshuler [2013].
4 See [Wisnewski 2005; Bortolotti and Nagasawa 2009; Fischer 2009a]
5 The line between categorical and conditional desires is a thin one, and desires can cross over 
from one to the other; what begins as a fervent categorical desire to go on a second date may, 
after enough dating experiences, turn into just another thing to do as long a there is a Saturday
night to fill. It is not inconceivable that many, if not all, of our categorical desires might cross 
over into conditional ones in this way given enough time.
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already happened to her”.6 This assumes that aging is the only driving factorin character change. That may be true for the most part, but it is sometimesnot.  Changes  in  circumstances,  for  example,  can  bring  out  importantcharacter changes, at the very least by emphasizing previously latent aspectsof character.7 So it seems reasonable to think that an immortal could undergoquite significant character changes over the course of an endless life.
Williams argues that if we are to give up on constancy of character we mustaccept that under the condition of immortality, perhaps in the span of meremillennia,  we  should  have  entirely  different  characters,  ones  no  longeradequately related to our present aims and desires. And this change wouldthen violate  the  second  condition  on  the  desirability  of  immortality.  Thisargument has been met with a great deal of skepticism and puzzlement. Ourordinary lives are permeated by significant changes in desires and aims, yetones  that  do  not  (normally)  make  continuing  to  exist  into  old  ageundesirable. Why should immortality be different? Perhaps if we underwentextreme and sudden changes in character, such as changes that involve beingtransformed into a psychological clone of Napoleon, or if we knew we wouldover time become highly immoral creatures, we might wish to pull the plugbefore that happens or, at least, might have no desire to remain plugged in.8
6 [Williams 1973]
7 Consider the character features brought out in German citizens circa 1933, or in Millgram’s 
experiments on authority.
8 Assuming, of course, that there is a sense of personal identity that can persist through such 
changes in order to satisfy the first condition.
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But what if  the changes in character undergone by immortals are just thekind we expect in our normal lives? What if those changes are gradual, retaincontinuity between old and new projects and desires,  and take place as aresult  of  rational  (or  at  least  normally  rational)  reflection  on  ourcircumstances? Such changes are ones we accept and frequently welcome ineveryday life; why not in an immortal life?9
An interesting feature of this response to Williams is that it makes his position not
simply untenable, but incomprehensible. A man who knows perfectly well that we
normally undergo a fair bit of change in our lives and that knowing this does not
make  continuing  to  live  undesirable,  should  not  think  that  simply  adding  an
indefinite number of such changes to our future must cancel out that desirability.
The standard response to Williams, in other words, either displays a bizarre blind
spot in Williams’s view or fails in its application of the principle of charity. We are
forced to choose between wondering how Williams could commit  an obvious
oversight that vitiates the core of his argument or, as I prefer, to look for a more
charitable reading. I think there are two ways to read the argument charitably: by
focusing on the attitude toward identity involved, and by examining the kind of
desirability in question.
First,  consider  the  scenario  Williams  evokes.  Should  my  character  go  on
changing—for millennia and beyond—it seems reasonable to suppose that the
resulting  person’s  desires,  after  some arbitrarily  long  period  of  time,  will  not
9 [Bruckner 2012; Fischer 2009b; Chappell 2009; Smuts 2011]
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appear  to  me  now to  have  anything in  common  with  my  present  aims  and
purposes.  This  future  being  will  presumably  have  gone  through  countless
relationships of many kinds and developed interests I cannot even conceive of;10
and such a person is likely to have attitudes such that while some of them I might
find sympathetic, others I will not understand at all, and some may seem, from
my standpoint, rather horrific. To deny this,  it  seems to me, is simply to deny
either variability in character or the possibilities open within an infinitely long life.
That is, the person I would become after a sufficiently long period of time will not
—from  my  current  perspective—be  me,  but  a  complete  stranger,  far  more
different  from  my current  aims  and  interests  than  my  present-day  next-door
neighbor.
Such a person might, of course, maintain the same personal identity as I in some
broad metaphysical sense of identity. But if we compare me now with this far-
removed future person in question, it should seem clear enough that identity in
the Parfitian sense of survival is undermined; this person may psychologically be
further removed from me than Napoleon. Why, then, should I find the continued
survival of this person desirable? To do so merely on the grounds that this person
shares biological and psychological origins with me, however distant from them
he  may  now  be,  has  less  to  do  with  rational  desirability  than  with  rather
thoughtless sentimentality.
10 What count as acceptable relationships can be expected to change over time; similarly the 
possible interests my future immortal counterpart can take up have, likely in many cases, not 
yet been invented.
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But here I have not taken the  entire response to Williams into account; I have
considered  only  the  comparison  between  current  and  far-distant  future  me,
leaving out any discussion of the gradual continuity of change from one to the
other. After millennia, the resulting person may be different enough from me that
a transition from me to him would not count as survival-preserving if we consider
the two persons in question side by side; but it is survival preserving granted that
the change is continuous in the way that everyday change in character is. If this
objection is right, then I now have just as much reason to desire the continued
survival of my far-distant future self as I do of my far-less-distant future self ten or
twenty years from now. This focus on continuity of change, however, conceals an
important distinction between two ways of seeing the sense of identity involved in
survival: the forward-looking and backward-looking perspective. Developing this
distinction, in my view, is central to reading Williams charitably.
To clarify the distinction, I want to consider a recent debate between MaryaSchechtman and the late Peter Goldie. Schechtman11 argues that the standardLockean  accounts  of  identity  overlook  a  feature  crucial  to  our  survival:empathy. She develops the argument by reference to Parfit’s famous Russiannobleman thought experiment. The Russian nobleman, young and filled witha philanthropic sense of social justice, worries that in his later years he willbecome conservative and wish to keep his vast resources to himself ratherthan  sharing  them  with  peasants.  Schechtman  argues  that  the  Russiannobleman  sees  his  likely  change  of  character  as  genuinely  survival-
11 [2001]
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threatening, and that this threat to survival is of a fairly ordinary kind. Toprevent this sort of alienation from different stages in our lives, Schechtmanargues that we need empathy with our past states. Having empathy with ourpast states does not, on her view, require that we continue living our lives inaccordance with them. It requires only that we give them, so to speak, a seatat  the  table;  that  we still  be  able  to  see ourselves  in  those  past  traits,  torecognize them as ours, and to consult them—though not necessarily to givethem  overriding  weight—in  our  current  deliberations.  If,  by  contrast,  wereject those states entirely, denying them any rational force in our presentconsiderations, this is tantamount to permanently silencing our past selves,much as if they had ceased to live.
What I want to stress here is the first move in Schechtman’s argument: that the
sort of threat to survival the Russian nobleman fears does speak to a kind of
concern we normally have, and even if such a normal and continuous change in
character does not threaten survival in a basic sense, there is a more “subtle”
sense of survival (as she puts it) that is threatened here. Schechtman's view is a
forward-looking one:  it  assesses survival  from a perspective that  looks at  my
future self and finds the prospect of myself becoming such a person disquieting.
What's  significant  about  this  perspective  for  our  present  purposes  is  that
continuity of change does not remove the threat to survival, if there is one here.
On the contrary, the fact that the change is a gradual one may serve to make the
threat appear worse. The young Russian nobleman might prefer to be abruptly
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transformed  into  an  altogether  different  person,  as  an  abrupt  transformation
would  spare  him  from what  he  anticipates  will  be  a  gradual  and  continuous
erosion of his most deeply held values. If this account does identify a genuine
threat to survival in some subtle sense, then, it offers support to Williams’s worry
about immortality, since presumably the Russian nobleman’s self in two millennia
is likely to care even less about peasants than his self in a mere twenty years
and is likely to embody far less of what the Russian nobleman currently values in
himself.  Moreover,  in  the  case  of  immortality,  this  threat  is  likely  far  more
universal; while not everyone has reason to think they will face a destruction of
their cherished practical identities in the course of their mortal lives, as in the
Russian nobleman's case, we all will likely undergo such drastic changes given
infinite  time.  If  the  threat  to  survival  persists  despite—and  to  some  extent
because of—the continuity between my present and my far-distant future self, the
forward-looking perspective that makes this threat manifest seemingly allows for
a vindication of Williams's argument.
Goldie, on the other hand, worries that the empathy requirement on survivalunacceptably  constrains  our  possibilities.12 Since  many  of  our  desires,projects,  and character  traits  may be misguided,  the  ability  to leave thembehind is crucial to growth. Given normal human maturation, it is likely thatall  of  us  will  need  to  leave  youthful  aims  for  more  informed  and  morepractical ones. Nor, argues Goldie, is giving up empathy with one’s misguidedpast  self  threatening  to  survival;  surely  I  can  reconstruct  my past  self  in
12 See [Goldie 2012, Ch. 7]
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narrative despite a lack of empathy with some, perhaps even many, of mypast projects and aims. In fact,  Goldie argues, “the subtle sense of survivaladds nothing of any importance”,13 because survival is clearly preserved inany number of cases where, far from empathizing with our former selves, wefeel ashamed of or deeply alienated from them. “Alienation and mortificationand so on are perfectly possible in our engagement with our past and ourfuture,  and they in  no way bring into  question our  basic  survival;  on thecontrary, they imply it—we remain riveted to our past as, precisely, ours.”14 IfSchechtman's concern is that my survival is threatened in a subtle sense bythe prospect of a future self who cannot empathize with my current aims,Goldie's  response  is  that,  far  from  threatening  survival,  many  empathy-negating  reactive  attitudes  toward  one's  former  self  imply  survival.  Themature, conservative Russian nobleman can be ashamed of his youthful self'squixotic ambitions only because those ambitions were his. 
Schechtman addresses this scenario, but her response to it  is precisely what
characterizes her view as forward-looking: the point, for her, is not that in looking
back at my (very different) past self I may see my survival threatened, but that
looking ahead to my future self, I see that self's lack of empathy with my current
self as threatening to my survival. Her focus, in other words, is on what might
appear threats to survival  from my perspective now, looking forward. Goldie's
focus, on the other hand, is on such threats from the perspective of my future self
13 [Goldie 2012, 140]
14 [Goldie 2012, 141]
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looking  back,  and  this  focus  suggests  that  worries  about  those  threats  are
misplaced. Goldie’s response, then, seems to offer support to Williams’s critics in
much the same way that Schechtman’s argument undermines their view.
As I noted at the outset, the difference here may be one of temperament. Moore,
following Williams, suggests that “it is surely just … a matter of temperament, as
much as the forces of reason, that leads philosophers to disagree so trenchantly
about the issues raised in Williams's essay”.15 Here, I am attempting to provide
some content to that difference in temperament by suggesting that it may result
partially from differences in  the perspective one takes on one's  survival.  And
once one takes a particular perspective, reasons to desire or reject immortality
come with it,  which is why the debates over Williams's argument aren't  just a
matter of temperament. Some of us are more inclined to think of survival in a
forward-looking  way.  That  is,  we  worry  about  what  sorts  of  possible  future
changes would, or would not, undermine our survival, and we try (or hope) to
avoid ones that would do so. A backward-looking take on survival, on the other
hand, brushes these worries aside: we naturally mature and undergo significant
character changes, and while we may find some such changes regrettable when
we look back on our lives, for many we do not. Even though we may once have
considered such changes threatening to our very survival, by taking a backward-
looking perspective we can avoid the worries, since we have reason to suspect
that, having lived through the character changes in question, we will (in the usual
kind of case) still  be ourselves, puzzled about  why we worried so in the first
place. The Russian nobleman may hate the prospect of becoming the sort  of
15 [Moore 2006, 458]
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conservative  landowner  he  despises.  But  as  the  conservative  landowner—
perhaps wiser but perhaps more resigned to the ways of the world—he thinks his
former ambitions foolish, the product of an immature mind, and while he may
miss the fire that came with those sentiments, the sentiments themselves seem
distasteful and certainly a good riddance. Those who entertain a forward-looking
perspective thereby have a reason to be weary of immortality, seeing it (perhaps
somewhat paradoxically) as the ultimate threat to survival, in the form of a distant
future self who repudiates and buries the commitments they take to be central to
their selves. Those with a backward-looking perspective can remain unperturbed
by the prospect of living forever: for them, change over time typically leaves their
selves intact.16
There is, then, a perspective on survival—a forward-looking one—that supports
Williams’s  contention.  Those  who  prefer  to  take  a  backward-looking  view  of
survival  will  no  doubt  be  more  likely  to  think  that  passing  judgment  on  the
desirability of immortality now is premature: we should wait and see. Having lived
through countless character changes, we will be in a better position to determine
whether or not we have survived them, and most likely the answer will be that we
have. If there is a problem with this view, it seems, it is only this: how long should
one wait?  For  one problem that  confronts Williams’s  critics  is  that  if  passing
judgment on the desirability of immortality now is premature, then it will  always
be premature. The question he poses about desirability is, from the backward-
16 I say “typically” and (above) “in the usual kind of case”, because there may be some 
experiences—especially traumatic ones—in which the subject of the experience may 
genuinely doubt, looking backwards, whether they really survived as the same person. For 
discussion, see Brison [2003].
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looking perspective,  unanswerable,  despite  the number  of  positive  responses
offered in the literature; and in this sense at least the forward-looking perspective
is superior. Of course this may not bother Williams's critics, who might reply that
this is their point: we have no grounds for saying, at the outset, that immortality is
undesirable. But if this is a feature of the backward-looking perspective, then we
cannot say that immortality is  desirable, either. The best we can say is that, at
any point in a life (however long), we may find some reason to see continued
survival past that point desirable. But this Williams grants. None of this is to say
that  the forward-looking perspective is more desirable all  things considered.  I
doubt we could say that about either perspective, and I suspect most of us have
both perspectives on our lives, especially as we age, and find important uses for
them. But  while both perspectives have their  advantages,  the forward-looking
one seems better suited for addressing the question of whether immortality is
desirable, if only because the backward-looking perspective cannot get a grip on
the problem at all.
We may now continue this thought into the second concern I suggested at the
outset: just what does it mean to say that immortality—as opposed, simply, to
living longer, perhaps long enough to be able to satisfy all our categorical desires
as they arise—is desirable?
On some views, there is no difference between wanting to be immortal andwanting to continue to live to satisfy our projects: if one thinks that we willalways have projects, then the two are the same. Many responses to Williams,
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in fact, do seem to assume that to prove the desirability of immortality, all weneed to do is show that it is possible to never run out of projects, and thusthat we can always have a reason to go on living.17  Williams, of course, deniesthat we can never run out of projects; coming to an agreement on whether wewould  necessarily run  out,  however,  is  the  hard  part,  and  takes  us  intospeculative  territory.18 I  want  instead  to  focus  on  the  assumption  thatdesiring to live forever is just like always desiring to live. As Rosenberg nicelysums up this view, a desire for immortality is nothing more than a desire foran open future.19 In our mortal lives, that is, we see our futures as constrainedby death; the desire for immortality is merely the desire for a removal  ofthose constraints, that is, for the freedom to continue pursuing our projectsindefinitely.  I  want to propose,  in  opposition to this  move,  that  there is  asignificant  difference  between  the  desire  to  be  immortal  and  the  morecommonplace desire to live to satisfy one’s projects, one that suggests thatWilliams’s opponents are talking past him.
Our everyday desiring has contours: sometimes we have a very sharp image of
what  we desire;  other times,  its edges are fuzzy.  Sometimes I  want  a crème
brûlée, while other times I want to do something entertaining. Still, even in the
17 [Fischer 2009b; Fischer 2009a; Chappell 2009]
18 Though Aaron Smuts has raised some strong arguments to back up Williams’s side, arguing 
that immortality would lead to a collapse of our motivational structures, despite rejecting 
Williams's own formulation (2011)
19 Rosenberg’s view here presupposes his argument that immortality must be reversible—in this 
case, of course, being able to live forever loses much of the negative appearance brought out 
by the possibility of endless boredom. See Rosenberg [2006].
15
latter sort of case, I have at least some idea of what I'm looking for. This is true
even  in  so-called  “transformative  experiences”,  where  as  a  result  of  the
experience one is epistemically or  personally transformed. In the most  widely
discussed  account,  put  forward  by  L.  A.  Paul,  one  cannot  make  a  rational
decision about whether to have children on the basis of what it will be like to have
them, because the experience of having children is transformative: one cannot,
prior to the experience, know what one will be like (and what things will be like for
one) post experience.20 Even in these cases, however, we have a rough outline
of both the object of our desire and of what we will be like after obtaining it. We
have a good sense both of what is possible and what is likely in the domain of
human experience, and so while we do not—in a sufficiently limited sense of
“know”--know what we will  be like post experience, we can have some pretty
good ideas. The same is true of the desire for an open future. While of course I
may not know what my future holds, and thus what projects I will pursue and care
about completing in the future, I do know what to expect in the realm of human
experience.  Desiring  an open  future  is  not,  in  other  words,  so  different  from
desiring, in my thirties, to live into my eighties. Is desiring to be immortal like this?
Consider  my  earlier  discussion  of  the  idea  that  immortality  will  lead  tomassive changes in character, sufficient to render me unrecognizable. Herewe  might  still  insist  that  we  have  some idea  of  what  we  are  desiring  indesiring to live forever,  since this  seems very much like desiring an openfuture. I think we can already spot some differences, however: I now have a
20 See Paul [2015].
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sense  of  what  I  desire  in  desiring  to  live  into  my  eighties,  but  in  a  fewmillennia the world might be so radically different from what it is like now,that the person I would be in it, and the possibilities open to that person totake  up  as  projects,  would  be  entirely  unrecognizable  to  me.  But  nowconsider what other changes immortality would require. Malpas, followingWilliams, argues that a human life,  to have projects,  must have a sense ofclosure,  a possibility  of  death,  for the individual  projects  in that  life  drawtheir meaning from one’s sense of life as a whole.21 Echoing this sentiment,Samuel Scheffler has recently argued that in imagining immortals, “we aretrying to imagine creatures who have little in their existence that matchesour  experience  of  tragic  or  even  difficult  choices,  and  nothing  at  all  thatmatches  our  experience  of  decisions  made against  the  background of  thelimits imposed by the ultimate scare resource, time.”22 Such creatures wouldbe  fundamentally  different  from  us,  because  “the  aspects  of  life  that  wecherish most dearly—love and labor,  intimacy and achievement,  creativityand humor and solidarity and all the rest—all have the status of values for usbecause of their role in our finite and bounded lives.”23 Like Malpas, Schefflerconcludes that our valuing itself depends on our mortality; without death, thedomain of values would either be nonexistent or highly constrained (since, as
21 See [Malpas 1998]. Similar arguments are suggested by Nussbaum [1989],  who argues that 
mortality is built into our evaluative structures, and is thus a condition of our finding 
something desirable, and by Burley [2009], who holds that we cannot judge whether a life is 
desirable without having some idea of what the whole of that life might look like, a condition 
it is impossible to fulfill in the case of an immortal life.
22  Scheffler [2013, 99]
23  Scheffler [2013, 100]
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he notes, at last some kinds of temporal scarcity would still be present in evenimmortal lives). 
I do not think we need to go so far to make the point I want to make, nor do I
think we  should go so far.  It may be a mistake to say that  projects  as such
necessarily require some sense of mortality to be meaningful or valuable. For it
seems likely that our concern with  wholeness,  perhaps with meaning itself,  is
predicated on our mortality. Immortals would have no need to give a shape to
their life as a whole, and thus no need to assign values to items depending on
their  place  within  that  whole.  That  need  not  mean immortals  could  have  no
projects or values, however; only that the internal structure of their lives would be
sufficiently different from ours to render it unimaginable for us. 
We desire to go on living because we want to complete projects, projects that
give sense to our lives as wholes. In wanting an open future, we want to retain
that  basic structure of  projects.  But  to desire immortality is  to desire a life in
which wholeness in irrelevant and projects do not draw their significance from it.
So if immortals can have projects—a possibility I do not want to rule out—we can
have no idea of what those projects might be like or what sort of meaning they
might have. In this sense, then, desiring to be immortal is nothing like desiring to
have an open future, which is at bottom simply a desire for more of the kind of life
we have,  that is,  a mortal  one. One might think that the contrast  here is too
starkly  drawn.  True,  immortals  may  have  a  sense  of  projects  and  values
completely unfathomable to us, but if I were to consume a potion tomorrow that
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would  make  me immortal,  surely  I  would  not  magically  forget  what  projects,
desires, values, and meaning are like. So, the objection might go, immortality for
me really  would be just like more of the kind of life I now have. This objection
seems short sighted. If I were to acquire the power of flight tomorrow, I might
spend a few days walking around, out of habit, but would start zooming through
the air soon enough (perhaps as soon as I realized how much I could save on
footwear). Similarly, were I to suddenly become immortal, I might spend some
time enjoying an open future—that is, continuing engaging in the same projects
as ever, with the same meaning (subjectively, at least) as ever—but sooner or
later I would drift toward an existence that, for me now, is unimaginable.
If a desire for immortality is just a desire for an open future, it is not in thesense that it is a future about which we have incomplete information, but inthe sense that it is a future about which we cannot have information, becausewe cannot imagine what sort of beings we would be in it. One may want sucha future; one may want to see what sort of being one would be under suchconditions.24 But one cannot desire it in the sense in which one simply desiresto go on living, because the latter sort of desire rests on our projects whilethe former implies a life structured by projects unfathomable to us (if thereare even projects in it).  And so we cannot,  from the claim that one mightalways want to go on living, conclude that one has reason to desire to alwayslive. For, returning once more to Williams's formulation, if I were to becomeimmortal, “the state in which I survive” cannot “be one which, to me looking
24 [Rosenberg 2006]
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forward, will be adequately related, in the life it presents, to those aims whichI now have in wanting to survive at all.” The desire for immortality is a desirewithout contours, and if it is a desire at all—and not simply a confused wishto have more of the same mortal life without the pesky mortality—then it isradically unlike any desire we might have for our future. If we want to readWilliams  charitably,  then,  we  might  ask  not  whether  immortality  can  bedesirable, but whether it is even possible to desire it.25
25 I would like to thank participants at the inaugural meeting of the International Association for 
the Philosophy of Death and Dying for helpful feedback on the early presented version of this 
paper and Christopher Belshaw for his detailed comments on the previous draft.
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